The State of Cryptography
Cryptographic library adoption across 11 package ecosystems
NIST Post-Quantum Deadlines
NIST IR 8547 transition deadlines for quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms
NIST targets deprecation of quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms (RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, DSA) by this date. Symmetric ciphers (AES) and hash functions (SHA-2, SHA-3) are unaffected.
Quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms must be fully replaced. Symmetric crypto (AES-128/256) and hash functions remain approved.
Algorithms with known cryptanalytic breaks (MD5, SHA-1, DES, RC4, Blowfish) or unmaintained implementations with known CVEs. These should be replaced regardless of quantum computing timelines.
e.g. MD5, SHA-1, DES, 3DES, RC4, Blowfish
Actively maintained cryptographic libraries using current-generation algorithms. Includes both quantum-safe symmetric crypto (AES-256, SHA-256, ChaCha20) and quantum-vulnerable asymmetric crypto (RSA, ECDSA, Ed25519). The asymmetric algorithms in this tier are targets for NIST's 2030/2035 PQC transition.
e.g. AES-GCM, SHA-256, ECDSA, Ed25519, Argon2, bcrypt
Implementations of NIST-standardized post-quantum algorithms (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) that resist both classical and quantum attacks. These are the replacements for RSA and ECDSA mandated by NIST IR 8547.
e.g. ML-KEM (Kyber), ML-DSA (Dilithium), SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+)
Note: The "Modern" tier includes both quantum-safe symmetric crypto (AES-256, SHA-256) and quantum-vulnerable asymmetric crypto (RSA, ECDSA). The NIST 2030/2035 deadlines apply only to the asymmetric algorithms. Symmetric crypto and hashes remain approved beyond 2035.
Crypto Health by Ecosystem
Of 65.7K packages using cryptography (from 2,170,994 analyzed), here is where they stand by package count - click an ecosystem for details
PQC Adoption Projection(measured: July 2026)
Dashed lines = mathematical estimates from a single snapshot. Solid dot = actual measurement. PQC adoption plotted on right axis (different scale) due to early-stage adoption levels. Historical trend data collection begins with the July 2026 census. Future runs will add real data points.
Download volume by cryptographic tier - click a segment for details
PQC Migration Projection
Projected PQC adoption using logistic S-curve model (Bass diffusion) with NIST deadline markers
Projections use a logistic growth model (S-curve), standard for technology adoption forecasting (Bass, 1969). Unlike compound growth models which imply unbounded exponential expansion, S-curves model realistic adoption with an inflection point and saturation ceiling. Actual adoption will depend on regulatory mandates, tooling maturity, and industry coordination.
Category Analysis
Weak/modern/PQC breakdown by cryptographic use case - click a category for package details
Migration Paths
Weak packages paired with recommended replacements, sorted by migration gap - click for details
Ecosystem Breakdown
Cryptographic library adoption by download volume across 10 ecosystems - hover slices, click for packages
Ecosystem Readiness Radar
Modern + PQC adoption percentage across all 10 ecosystems
Top Packages by Downloads
Measured download counts only - click a bar for details, filter by tier
Largest modelled figures, not ranked above
These registries publish no download counts. Each figure is a proxy signal multiplied by a constant - Go uses GitHub stars x 1,000, Maven versionCount x 50,000, and NuGet and RubyGems divide a lifetime cumulative total by an assumed 36 and 120 months. They are shown for scale and are not comparable with the measured counts above.
GitHub Popularity vs Downloads
Stars indicate developer interest, downloads indicate deployment
Project Crypto Exposure
Which popular open source projects depend on weak cryptography?
Dependency analysis detected cryptographic usage in 65,686 packages. Deep source-level scanning (cryptoserve scan) on a sample of 20 top projects found 4x more crypto patterns -- including stdlib calls, algorithm constants, and TLS configurations invisible to dependency matching.
| Project | Downloads/mo | Posture | Crypto DepsWeak / Modern / PQC | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
react npm | 62.0M | No Crypto | > | |
lodash npm | 52.0M | No Crypto | > | |
axios npm | 48.2M | No Crypto | > | |
requests PyPI | 42.0M | Modern | 1M | > |
express npm | 34.2M | Weak | 2W | > |
webpack npm | 28.4M | Mixed | 1W | > |
next npm | 22.1M | Modern | 2M | > |
spring-boot Maven Central | 18.4M | Mixed | 1W1M | > |
jsonwebtoken npm | 18.4M | Mixed | 1W1M | > |
django PyPI | 12.8M | Modern | 2M | > |
tokio-rs/tokio crates.io | 12.6M | No Crypto | > | |
fastapi PyPI | 9.2M | Modern | 2M | > |
flask PyPI | 8.4M | Modern | 1M | > |
hyper-rs/hyper crates.io | 8.2M | Modern | 2M | > |
apache/kafka Maven Central | 6.8M | Mixed | 1W1M | > |
laravel/framework Packagist | 6.2M | Modern | 2M | > |
gin-gonic/gin Go Modules | 4.2M | Mixed | 1W1M | > |
actix/actix-web crates.io | 3.4M | Modern | 2M | > |
IdentityServer4 NuGet | 3.4M | Modern | 2M | > |
symfony/security-bundle Packagist | 2.8M | Mixed | 1W1M | > |
Research Insights
Analytical findings and PQC readiness assessment - click findings for details
NIST 2030 PQC migration deadline
1,253 days (3 yrs, 158 days) remain until NIST targets deprecation of RSA, ECDSA, and other quantum-vulnerable algorithms. Organizations should have migration plans finalized and implementation underway well before this date to account for testing and validation cycles.
Annual supply chain exposure to weak cryptography
Extrapolating monthly weak crypto downloads to annual: ~12.3B package installations per year incorporate deprecated cryptographic primitives (MD5, SHA-1, DES, RC4, unmaintained libraries). Note: download counts include CI/CD and transitive dependencies and may overstate direct application usage.
Weak-to-PQC download ratio
For every 1 post-quantum crypto download, there are 233 downloads of weak/deprecated cryptographic packages. Note: PQC replaces quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms (RSA, ECDSA), not symmetric crypto or hashes. This ratio indicates how far behind PQC adoption trails legacy usage.
PQC adoption critically low before NIST deadline
Post-quantum cryptography accounts for only 0.1000% of tracked downloads, with 1,253 days remaining until the NIST 2030 deprecation deadline. At current adoption rates, the ecosystem is not on track for a timely transition.
Security advisory severity distribution
Of 7 crypto-related advisories among the 2,000 most recently reviewed GitHub advisories: 1 critical (14.3%), 2 high (28.6%), 1 medium, 3 low. Critical and high severity advisories require immediate attention in dependency audits.
Downloads using deprecated cryptography
14.5% of all tracked cryptographic package downloads (1.0B/month) rely on weak or deprecated algorithms including MD5, SHA-1, DES, RC4, and unmaintained libraries.
Single package concentration in weak crypto
rsa accounts for 27.7% of all weak crypto downloads (284.6M/month). Migrating this single dependency away from deprecated algorithms would substantially reduce ecosystem exposure.
npm has higher weak crypto usage than PyPI
npm weak crypto: 24.3% of downloads. PyPI weak crypto: 9.4% of downloads. npm shows a higher concentration of deprecated cryptographic libraries, indicating a greater need for migration tooling and awareness in that ecosystem.
Cryptographic CVE density across ecosystems
735 crypto-related CVEs mapped across 6.4B measured monthly downloads yields a density of 0.12 CVEs per million downloads. Ecosystems that publish no download counts are excluded from the denominator rather than estimated into it. Each vulnerability in a widely-used package multiplies exposure across dependent applications.
Leading modern cryptography package
cryptography leads modern crypto adoption with 1.4B/month (22.9% of modern tier). Modern packages provide audited, constant-time implementations but still require future PQC migration for quantum-vulnerable algorithms like ECDSA and RSA.
Quantum Threat & Migration
Algorithm vulnerability timeline, PQC implementation availability, and recommended actions
Vulnerability Landscape
Click rows and bars for detailed breakdowns
| CWE | Description | Count | |
|---|---|---|---|
| CWE-327 | Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm | 398 | |
| CWE-326 | Inadequate Encryption Strength | 336 | |
| CWE-328 | Use of Weak Hash | 1 |
Click a row for details
Click an arc or badge for details
HTML: Self-contained report with Chart.js visualizations | JSON: Raw data via API (CORS-enabled)
Aggregate scan summary for independent verification: 2,170,994 packages across 11 ecosystems, collected August 3, 2026. Per-package rows are not included.
Its download counts came from collectors that recorded a failed request as a count of zero, so they are understated, and the Hex and pub.dev scans behind its package totals were both defective. Every affected field is listed in the file's corrections block, with the direction of each error. The package-level corpus figures are unaffected. For current measured figures use the JSON or HTML report above.
Find Weak Crypto in Your Code
CryptoServe scans your codebase for vulnerable cryptographic implementations and generates a migration plan
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